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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, et al., 
Def end ants, 
* * * * * 
OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS & 
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD 
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY 
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10516 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This intermediate appeal involves the relative 
priorities of mechanic's lienors upon, and of a future 
advance construction mortgagee to, Lot 10, Lazy Bar 
Subdivision, an improved residential subdivision lot in 
Salt Lake County. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Ten cases, including the "bellwether" (Civil No. 
14 7326 below) in which this appeal is taken, involving 
twelve improved residential lots in Lazy Bar Subdivision 
in Salt Lake County were consolidated because of simi-
larity of issues of fact and law. By its fifth supplemental 
pretrial order, the trial court made certain rulings, of 
which the following two are the subject of this inter-
mediate appeal: 
1. A ruling that the operative documents evidencing 
the mortgage transaction between Western Mortgage 
Loan Corporation and Cottonwood Construction Com-
pany provided for "obligatory" (or more properly, "non-
volitional") 1 advances and that such advances, and the 
mortgagee's attorneys' fees and costs take priority as of 
the time of recordation of the mortgage. (R. 133, 134) 
2. A denial of the mechanic's lienors' motion for 
partial summary judgment to the effect that certain work 
constituted the "commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure or improve-
ment" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated 
38-1-5 ( 1953). (R. 133, 134) 
1. The traditional phrasing of the point of law here involved is that, if 
advances made under a prior mortgage are contractually "obligatory'', their 
priority none-the-less attaches ~s o~ the,,rec;irdation of such mortg';lgi;, but 
that - if future advances are 'opt10nal with the lender - the pnonty of 
each such advance attaches as of the date of the advance itself, Anno., 80 
A.L.R. 2d 179, 191. Appellants consider, however, that certain case author-
ity is more readily understood. if the formula is couched in .somewhat differ-
ent terminology, as follows: 1f advances made under a. p~1or mortgage are 
contractually "non-volitional" with the len~er, their pnonty attaches <i;S of 
the recordation of the mortgage, but - 1f future advances are entirely 
"volitional" with the lender - the priority of each such advance ;:tttaches 
as of the date of the advance itself. The point is that the question is wheth~r 
or not the lender's sole discretion is involved to any such advance. For this 
reason, the "volitional" - "non-volitional" terminology is utilized more 
often than not herein. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek the following relief on intermediate 
appeal: 
1. A determination that the construction financing 
transaction did not provide for obligatory (or, more 
properly, "non-volitional") advances but that, on the 
contrary, it provided for optional (or, more properly, 
"volitional") advances which take priority only as of the 
time of each such advance, or 
2. Determination that, in any event, volitional ex-
penditures made at the option of the mortgagee sub-
sequent to the default of the borrower take priority only 
as of he time of each such expenditure. 
3. Remand with instructions to grant the mechanic's 
lienors' motion for partial summary judgment to the 
effect that the work evidenced by affidavits in support 
of said motion constituted "commencement to do work 
or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement" within the meaning of Utah Code Anno-
tated 38-1-5 (1953), thus establishing the priority date 
for all mechanic's lien holders. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is an intermediate appeal from interlocutory 
rulings noted. Documents have been admitted in evi-
dence. Depositions have been published. Admissions have 
been made by pleadings or otherwise. Certain facts have 
been developed by affidavits. No testimony yet has been 
presented personally to the trier of fact. 
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Some time prior to the beginning of 1960, probably 
the latter part of 1959, the owners of an unimproved 
tract of Salt Lake County realty decided to develop a 
residential subdivision thereon. They entered into a con-
tract with Harrison & Moore, a partnership, which 
contract provided, in part, for sale of the land to the 
partnership for $84,000 and further that the purchasers 
would develop a subdivision or subdivisions on the land, 
including platting of the land, installation of water mains, 
grading and surfacing of roads, installation of curb and 
gutter, and other improvements necessary under applica-
ble ordinances. The agreement further provided for 
payment for individual lots and the building of homes 
thereon. The individual lots could be paid for by mort-
gages and notes subordinated to construction mortgages. 
It was contemplated that they would be paid out when 
the homes were sold. ( R. 163-168) 
Harrison & Moore, in turn, contracted with James 
A. Finnegan, Jr., and wife, in essentially the same terms 
but at slightly higher prices. In addition, part of the 
price to be paid by Finnegan was to go directly to the 
surveyor for work done. Finnegans, in turn, assigned their 
interest to Cottonwood Construction Company, a corpo-
ration, of which Finnegan was one of the principals. 
( R. 169-1 77 ) 
Early in 1960 a subdivision plat was submitted to 
the county officials. It contained 55 lots, and was known 
as Lazy Bar subdivision. County approval was obtained 
in the latter part of 1960. 
Commencing in the latter part of 1959 and going 
into approximately October of 1960, Charles V. King, 
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licensed engineer and surveyor, surveyed the land, platted 
it, placed visible stakes upon the ground marking the 
lots, including Lot 10, thus defining the intended sub-
division development. ( R. 69) 
Following the surveying and platting, Lloyd Jackson 
and Rex L. Jackson, contractors, installed the roads, curb 
and gutter, sidewalks, water mains, sewer mains and 
sewer laterals throughout most of the subdivision, in-
cluding Lot 10. The lateral sewer line installed on Lot 
10 terminated inside the lot itself by some three feet, 
and in installing the sewer lateral the trench required 
for it extended into the lot inside the platted lot line 
approximately eleven feet. Installation of the sewer mains 
and laterals was completed about January 1, 1961. Water 
main installation was completed about August, 1962. 
Roads, curb and gutter were commenced in 1961 and 
completed in 1962. (R. 72-75) 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company 
erected utility poles in the subdivision, including one on 
Lot 10. The installation included ground anchors and the 
stringing of telephone cables to serve Lot 10. (R. 80) 
Following the foregoing work, short term future 
advance construction financing on several of the lots in 
the subdivision was obtained from plaintiff, Western 
Mortgage Loan Corporation (hereinafter designated 
Western), or United Savings and Loan Association, con-
struction mortgagee in some of the companion cases. 
(R. 152, pages 5, 6, 11) 
Application for future advance construction financ-
ing on Lot 10 was made to Western. U pan approval by 
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Westem's loan committee, documents evidencing the 
transaction were prepared, dated all the same date, and 
executed by the parties. (R. 152, page 8) The five 
documents, dated October 29, 1962, used for the future 
advance construction financing of Lot 10 were : 
1. Note. 
2. Mortgage. 
3. Building and Loan Agreement and Assignment 
of Account. (hereinafter designated Loan Agree-
ment) 
4. Release, Indemnity and Schedule A. (hereinafter 
designated Schedule A) 
5. Pre-construction Affidavit. (All these documents 
are in R. 151, Exhibits W-2) 
The note is in the face amount of $15,750.00. It is 
secured by the mortgage which was recorded October 29, 
1962, the date it bears. 
The Loan Agreement specifically incorporates 
Schedule A. 
Although the Loan Agreement provides that the 
net proceeds of the loan shall be deposited in a special 
non-interest bearing account, no such deposit was ever 
made. In fact there was no segregation of funds from 
the general funds of the lender and no funds were in 
fact committed thereto in advance by the lender. (R. 
82-3) 
Schedule A provides, as here pertinent, for the dis-
bursement of funds to be in the discretion of the lender, 
contains provisions exculpating the lender from almost 
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all liability otherwise usually incident to such a trans-
action, lists a schedule of fund advances but provides also 
that changes in this schedule of advancements "as to 
amounts and time of disbursement may be made at any 
time by the [lender] as it may, in its sole discretion, 
determine." 
In the Pre-construction Affidavit, Finnegan and an 
associate stated that no work has been started and no 
materials furnished for Lot 10. 
Of the five documents evidencing the transaction 
between the lender and the borrower, only the mortgage, 
which recites, contrary to the fact, that the full $15,750.00 
had been received by the borrower, was placed on record. 
The remaining four documents were not. 
Western assigned its mortgage to First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. as security. First Security Bank 
of Utah, N.A. was brought into the case as an involuntary 
defendant. 
As shown by its ledger, Western attributed advances 
to Lot 10 at frequent intervals from October 31, 1962, 
to January 24, 1963. (R. 151, Exhibit W-84) At about 
this time, Western, learning of purported misuse of funds 
by the borrowers principals, refused further advances to 
Cottonwood, thereby stopping work on Lot 10 and other 
lots. (R. 152, page 18; R. 2) 
Paragraph 10 of the unrecorded Loan Agreement 
provided that upon default of the borrower, including 
work stoppage by the lender under the terms of the 
agreement, the lender could, at its option, ( 1) declare 
all sums advanced immediately due and payable and be 
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released from all further obligations to the borrower, or 
( 2) take possession of the premises, finish improvements 
and charge the costs thereof to the borrower to be secured 
by the note and mortgage. (R. 151, Exhibits W-2) These 
rights of the lender were cumulative and not to the 
prejudice of any other rights under its mortgage. 
Although the lender was at this stage relieved of any 
obligation to advance further funds, it voluntarily and 
without benefit of a receiver, took possession of the 
premises and completed the improvements thereon, 
charging all expenditures, costs and various miscellaneous 
fees to the borrower. Then several months later it brought 
this suit to foreclose, claiming all advances, both before 
and after default to be secured by the mortgage and to 
take priority as of the recording of the mortgage. (R. 152, 
page 18; R. 151, Exhibits W-84) 
Western had advanced $9,462.04, according to its 
ledger sheet, at the time it caused stoppage of the work 
and exercised its option to enter the premises and take 
over the job. ( R. 151, Exhibits W-84) 
Liens for unpaid materials were filed by Oscar E. 
Chytraus Co. in the amount of $665.38 (R. 40); by 
Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Company in the 
amount of $479.83 (R. 35); by Richard P. Garrick in 
the amount of $283.46 (R. 45); and Boise Cascade 
Corporation in the amount of $508.33 (R. 36); all for 
sums due for materials furnished prior to Western's 
exercise of its option. 
Western's complaint prayed for $14,312.64 and 
attorneys' fees and costs, ( R. 1 ) up to the time of the 
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complaint. It also prayed for such additional sums as 
might have been expended by it subsequent to the com-
plaint. Exhibit W-84 shows a total of $16,43.5.47 at-
tributed to Lot 10 as of January 8, 1965. Thus $6,973.43 
of the amount prayed for by Western, not including 
attorney's fees and costs attributable by it to this same 
expenditure, represents expenditures or charges made by 
Western subsequent to its exercise of its option to enter 
the premises and take over the project. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT CONSTRUCTION FINANCING ARRANGE-
MENT BETWEEN WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION AND COTTONWOOD CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY PROVIDED FOR NON-
VOLITIONAL ADVANCES AND THAT ALL SUCH 
ADVANCES THEREFORE TOOK PRIORITY AS 
OF THE TIME OF RECORDATION OF THE 
MORTGAGE. 
(A) INSTEAD, T H E C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N 
FINANCING ARRANGEMENT PROVIDED 
FOR VOLITIONAL ADVANCES AND 
THUS EACH ADVANCE MADE THERE-
UNDER TAKES PRIORITY ONLY AS OF 
ITS DATE. 
This point concerns a future advance construction 
financing arrangement, the express written terms of 
which are before the Court. We are not concerned with 
construction financing in general nor with the various 
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other types of arrangements which might be used for 
construction financing. 2 It may be appropriately here 
pointed out that no evidence was presented to the trial 
court, nor is any before this Court, to the effect that the 
written documents and their terms as here used are 
typical or atypical of the documents and terms used in 
the construction financing business. Moreover, no re-
ported construction financing cases have been found 
dealing with the specific language under scrutiny in this 
Point. 
The issue at hand is what the parties agreed to. 
What may have been desirable or ordinary in <;uch an 
agreement is not germane except to the extent that the 
documents used might fairly accomplish such purpose by 
their own terms - not by Sunday morning quarter-
backing. 
Nor should it be assumed that the mere fact that 
construction was the purpose for which money was 
borrowed dictates by some innate legerdemain the legal 
consequences of the transaction, thus avoiding all recourse 
to the terms of the agreement between the parties. 3 
2. See Appendix A. 
3. The mortgagee evidenced below understandable enthusiasm for the obiter 
dictum in Micele v. Falduti, 101 N. J. Eq. 103, 137 At!. 92 (1927) to the 
effect that " (a) ny building and loan mortgage advances are not optional" 
in that "the building and loan is bound to make the advances." Although 
the opinion does not enlighten as to the terms of the loan agreement therein, 
if the New Jersey Court meant to suggest th~t ad:vances . a~reed by. the 
parties to be discretionary would be held non-d1scret10nary 1f mserted m a 
construction loan agreement, it was far wide of the mark. See Gray v. Mc-
Clellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N. E. 1093 (1913) and Elmendorf-Anthony Co. 
v. Dunn, 10 Wash. 2d 29, 116 P. 2d 253 (1941) for case decisions negativ-
ing this proposition. Also see Spradling, "Legal Hazards of Construction 
Lending," 19 Business Lawyer 221 ( 1963) and "Th~ Open-End Mortgage 
- Future Advances. A Survey," 5 De Paul Law Review 76, 78 ( 1955) for 
scholarly articles which recognize that construction mortgage advances are 
not immune from the "volitional - non-volitional" rule. When read in con-
text in accord is Kratavil's chapter on "Mortgage Law" in the business 
schC:Ol text, Pease and Kerwood, Mortgage Banking, ( 1965). 
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The primary rules of law in the area here concerned 
are well established. If a mortgagee is legally bound to 
make advances, the fact that such advances might occur 
subsequent in time to the recording of the mortgage does 
not alter the priority of such advances - absent other 
factors not here pertinent, such advances relate back to 
the time of the recording of the mortgage. The reason 
for this rule is sound. Where the lender is bound to make 
the advances, he is unable to exercise discretion and being 
so bound is a legal detriment to him just as though he 
had already parted with the money. In legal contem-
plation, he is simply making deferred payments. 
Typical of the cases expressing this line of authority 
are: E. K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 118 Cal. 
App. 4 7 5, 5 P.2d 669 ( 1931), where the lender could 
not of its own volition refuse advances, the advances being 
tied to the progress of the work and an appraisal thereof; 
Lampson Lumber Co. v. Chiarelli, 100 Conn. 301, 123 
Atl. 909, 912 ( 1924), where there was a positive obliga-
tion to sell supplies to a party for use in the construction 
of a certain building at current prices; and Boise Payette 
Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 485, 276 Pac. 971, 
972 ( 1929), where the mortgagee was bound by his 
original agreement to make the advances specified. 
The rule is otherwise where the lender may in its 
own discretion refuse any or all such advances. Thus, 
where the full amount of the purported loan is not paid 
over to the borrower, but under the terms of the agree-
ment the lender may, at its own volitition, refuse to make 
future advances, any such advances take priority as to 
intervening liens only as of the time of each such dis-
12 
bursement and do not relate back to the recordation of 
the mortgage. 
Disregarding occasional, varied statutory modifica-
tion, not obtaining in Utah, the above rule is universally 
applied to construction mortgages - as well as any other 
type of mortgage. Superior Lumber Co. v. National Bank 
of Commerce, 176 Ark. 300, 2 S.W'.2d 1093 ( 1928); 
Community Lumber Co. v. California Puhl. Co., 215 
Cal. 274, 10 P.2d 60 ( 1932) ; Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. 
Williams, 121 Cal. App. 571, 9 P.2d 324 (1932); W. P. 
Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 2d 185, 191 Pac. 
1027 (1920); Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 47 Atl. 
327 ( 1900); Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 
Idaho 485, 276 Pac. 971 ( 1929) (dictum) ; Gray v. Mc-
Clellan, supra; Finlayson v. Crooks, 4 7 Minn. 74, 49 
N.W. 398 ( 1891); Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla. 
421, 165 P.2d 344 ( 1945) (where the mortgage con-
tained no provision requiring mortgagee to make ad-
vances, advances were held to be separate transactions 
inferior to intervening mechanics liens) ; Home Saving 
& Loan Association v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284 Pac. 
30 ( 1929). Heller v. Gate City Building and Loan Assn., 
75 N.M. 596, 408 P.2d 753 ( 1965); Elmendorf-Anthony 
Co. v. Dunn, supra. 4 
In W. P. Fuller & Co., supra, all advances over a 
certain amount were at the discretion of the lender. 
His lien was held inferior to the liens of intervening 
mechanics' lien claimants as to the advances he was not 
obligated to make. 
Although no Utah case squarely in point has been 
found, Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 
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12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 ( 1961) is persuasive 
precedent for the proposition that this Court recognizes 
the foregoing rules and specifically that discretionary 
advances take priority only as of the time of each such 
advance. In Mecham there was no agreement concerning 
future advances, merely a mortgage regular on is face 
for a sum certain. Under this set of facts, it was held 
that the law implied an obligation consonant with the 
terms of the mortgage and that, if the mony had not 
been paid out, the lender was under an obligation to 
pay it out according to the instructions of the borrower. 
This Court said : 
" . . . A mortgagee, who is loaning money to 
a mortgagor-borrower, is obligated to pay out the 
money in accordance with the directions of the 
borrower. This is especially so where, as in the in-
stant case, a sum certain is stated in the mortgage 
and no provisions are made for future advances." 
(Emphasis added) 
The basis for the rule regarding the priority only 
as of its own date of any discretionary advance rests 
on sound legal principal. A mortgage is security for a 
debt. Where there is a binding obligation to make an 
advance it may be equated in law with an advance 
already made, but where there is no such binding obliga-
4. The "volitional - non-volitional" rule is equally as applicable to ( 1) loan 
agreements secured by a mortgage for a stated sum which, in fact, secu.res 
future volitional advances up to that amount, as to ( 2). a loan tra~saction 
secured by an "open end" mortgage for a stated sum, m fact received by 
the mortgagor, plus open-end future advances. Gray. v: M cCl~llan! .supra, 
involved the first type of arrangement. Far from restnctmg the voht10nal -
non-volitional" rule to "open end" mortgages, a leading article on the sub-
jct Blackburn "Mortgages to Secure Future Advances," 21 Missouri Law 
Re'view 209 213-215 ( 1956), lists the "open end" mortgage as merely .one 
of four typ~s of secured transactions in which. tha.t rule m.ay come mto 
play - another of which is the type of transaction mvolved m our case. 
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tion the analogy fails and without a debt there is no 
mortgage. 
As a matter of fundamental fairness, no other con-
clusion is tenable. The law gives to a materialman or 
laborer improving property at the owner's instance the 
statutory right to look to the property for compensation 
therefor if need be, subject only to prior valid rights in 
the property. To make this right subject to subsequent, 
discretional advances of a lender would completely 
emasculate and nullify the legislatively established pro-
tection for the mechanic's lienor, for the lender could 
with impunity advance or refuse to advance as it chose, 
swallowing up, at its own volition, and for its own benefit, 
the protection intended the mechanic's lienors. 
The documents evidencing the transaction between 
Western and Cottonwood demonstrate on their face that 
Western here was not under a binding legal obligation 
to make advances, but that such advances were com-
pletely within the sole discretion of Western and further 
that, since Western was not liable for failure to make 
advances, no legal requirement to make advances existed. 
In determining the nature of the instant transaction 
recourse to all the documents involved is required. Gary 
v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E. 1093, 1094 (1913) 
and Doran v. Britto, 52 R.I. 425, 161 Atl. 141 (1932) 
hold that written agreements outside the mortgage may 
properly show the transaction to be discretionary. In 
fact, parol evidence would be admissible for this pur-
pose. Frank E. Ewing Co. v. Krafft Co., 222 Md. 21, 
158 A.2d 654, 659 (1960); W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Mc-
Clure, 48 Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027, 1030 ( 1920). 
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Western's contemporaneously executed documents, 
all of which were integral parts of the transaction may 
be - in fact, must be - considered together in deter-
mining the legal effects of the transaction. 
In addition to simultaneous execution, the operative 
documents specifically refer to each other and specifically 
incorporate each other into one integrated agreement. 
That the mortgagee was not bound to make future 
advances, but that making such future advances was 
entirely discretionary with it is patent upon an examina-
tion of the agreements prepared by it and used by it. 
The second unnumbered paragraph of the Loan 
Agreement provides that the net proceeds of the loan 
should not be given the borrower, but, on the contrary, 
would be deposited in an account with the lender (which 
was not done (R. 82-3)) and that such account was 
assigned by the borrower to the lender as security for 
itself. 5 That paragraph further provides: 
"Each of the undersigned acknowledges that 
he has no right to the moneys in the Account, other 
than to have the same used by the Lender in ac-
cordance with this Agreement, which the Lender 
agrees to do, upon its acceptance of this Agree-
ment." 
Paragraph 5 of the Loan Agreement provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, 
the Account shall be disbursed by the Lender from 
time to time as the construction of the improve-
ments progress in accordance with Schedule "A" 
attached hereto, ... Such disbursements may .be 
made to any of the undersigned, or, at the option 
of the Lender, may be made to contractors, mate-
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rialmen and laborers, or any of them, for work 
done or labor furnished in connection with such 
improvements." 
Schedule A, which also refers back to the Loan 
Agreement, provides, in part: 
"It is agreed that such disbursements are to 
be made wholly within the discretion of the [lend-
er J and we hereby release said [lender] from any 
liability for any error of judgment or for any act 
done or steps taken or omitted by it in good faith, 
or based on any mistake of fact or law, or for any-
thing it may do or refrain from doing in connec-
tion with such disbursements, excepting willful 
misconduct of its employees, it being particularly 
understood that said [lender] may take any action 
in connection with such disbursements in reliance 
upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt 
or other paper or document believed by it to be 
genuine and signed by the parties purporting to 
have executed it. It is understood that such dis-
bursements will be made by you in accordance with 
"Schedule A" as follows:" (Then follows a sched-
ule related to stages of construction.) (Emphasis 
supplied) 
In addition to the discretionary power and the 
exculpatory immunity from liability provided by the 
above paragraph, Schedule A effectively removes any 
doubt as to the optional nature of the lender's advances 
by specifically providing, immediately following the 
schedule listing, that: 
((Changes in the above ''Schedule A" as to 
5. In fact no such separate account was Pstablished in the sense that moneys 
were segr~gated out of the funds otherwise available to mo~tg.agee. The 
bookkeeping "credit" to such account was, therefore, a mere fict10n. 
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amounts. and time of disbursements may be made 
at any time by the [lender] as it may, in its sole 
discretion, determined." (Emphasis added) 
Although the note and mortgage recite receipt of the 
funds supposedly provided thereby, in fact, not one cent 
had been disbursed, and under these broad provisions of 
Schedule A, not one cent need be disbursed by the lender 
should it, in its "sole discretion" determine not to so 
disburse. Since the disbursements are relegated to the 
"sole discretion" of the lender, no legal right inhered in 
the borrower to compel disbursement and no legal penalty 
could be imposed upon the lender if in its "whole" or 
"sole" discretion it determined not to disburse. 
For the following five reasons - each sufficient unto 
itself - disbursements, from the very inception of the 
financing arrangement, remained within the control of 
the lender and were legally optional upon its part, and 
in no sense obligatory: 
1. Disbursements were wholly within the discretion 
of the lender. 
2. The borrower released the lender from con-
tractual liability for anything it might do or fail to do 
in this regard. 
3. Disbursements were not made when the docu-
ments were executed and were not to be even expected 
until certain stages of construction had been completed. 
4. And even then, in its "sole discretion" the lender 
could at any time alter the time when it would make 
advances, and 
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5. In addition thereto, in its "sole discretion" the 
lender could alter at any time the amount of advances. 
With the power to do all these things, and be relieved 
from contract liability for so doing, the lender could not 
be forced to disburse - ergo, disbursements, if and when 
made, were in contemplation of law volitional or optional, 
and while binding as between the parties, would take 
priority as to intervening liens only as of the time of each 
such disbursement. 
A party to a contracl is bound by the words used. 
This Court said in Valcarce v. Bitter, 12 Utah 2d 61, 
362 P.2d 427, 428 ( 1961): 
"(T)he court cannot fabricate the kind of 
contract the parties ought to have made and en-
force it." 
Regardless of any protestation by one of the parties 
to the instant contract that it was intended to provide for 
nondiscretionary payments, the fact remains that it did 
not. 
The intentional use of the words "discretion" and 
"sole discretion" obviate any possibility that the users 
meant something else; particularly is this evident from 
the setting in which the words are used. The entire pur-
pose of the Schedule A is to increase the rights of the 
lender, eliminate his liability and diminish the rights of 
the borrower. 
It is thus clear from the context in which used 
that the phrases "wholly within the discretion" and "sole 
discretion" in no manner signify "judicial discretion" but, 
are intended to convey the meaning generally attributed 
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to these words and phrases as here used, i.e., a sole or 
entire power of decision. 
Since "discretion" many have various meanings 
analysis of its use and the words used to modifv it are 
significant. , 
The adjective "sole" is variously defined by Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary as ( 1) having no 
spouse ... (2) having no companion ... (3) (a) having 
no sharer. .. (b) of unmatched quality of kind ... ( 4) 
functioning (as in acting, working, moving) independ-
ently and without assistance or interference ... ( 5) (a) 
... that is such and no other ( 6) belonging, granted, or 
atributed to the one person or group specified; in-
dependently accomplished, held or developed, exclusively 
exercised, unshared. . . . 
Thus modified, by "sole", which always denotes 
exclusivity and as used in relation to the remainder of 
the exculpatory and indemnifying provisions of Schedule 
A, discretion is meant to convey its common meaning, 
defined by Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary as "power of decision; individual judgment." The 
example there given is "it is a matter that I cannot leave 
to anyone's discretion - Upton Sinclair." 
Similarly, "wholly" is defined by Webster as: ( 1) In 
entriety; fully; as a whole without loss; as, to see a 
situation wholly. (2) To the whole extent; totally; en-
tirely; completely; thoroughly; as to be wholly at a loss; 
wholly finished. ( 3) To the exclusion of other things; 
solely. 
In meaning, the phrase "wholly within the discre-
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tion" and the phrase "sole discretion" as used in the 
instant documents are significantly similar to the expres-
sion "sole judge" used in Hell er v. Gate City Building and 
Loan Association, 75 N.M. 596, 408 P.2d 753 ( 1965) a 
case decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court within 
the last few months. There the mortgagee had the right 
to make needed repairs, and he was to be the "sole judge" 
of the necessity for the repairs. Against the assertions of 
the mortgagee that its advances so made should be 
deemed non-volitional and prior to intervening liens, the 
New Mexico Court said: 
"The language of the above provision grants 
appellant an option to make repairs. Appellant is 
made the sole judge as to the necessity of the re-. ,, 
pairs .... 
The manner in which the term "discretion" is used 
by those dealing in the mortgage area is also important, 
thus in Blackburn, "Mortgages to Secure Future Ad-
vances," supra, at 214, we find: 
"In the third type, the mortgage will also pro-
vide expressly for the making of future advances, 
but the making of these advancements is strictly 
within the discretion of the mortgagee. Such a de-
vice is termed a mortgage to secure 'optional fu-
ture advances'." (Emphasis added) 
and at page 223, the author says: 
"Optional Advances. The final type of mortgage 
to secure future advances is one wherein the mort-
gagee may make the advance solely at his option 
or discretion." 
In another factual setting, Davis v. General Foods 
Corporation, 21 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) held that 
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discretion to make payments meant a volitionary right to 
disburse, or not, depending on the decision reached by 
the holder of the power of discretion. 
Statutes bestowing "discretion" have been inter-
preted as imparting free choice to its recipient. State v. 
Pemiscot Land & Cooperage Co., 317 Mo. 41, 295 S.W. 
78, 80 (1927). And in Rollins v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 390, 
392 (8 Cir., 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 763 (1938) dis-
cretion in section 167 of the 1928 Internal Revenue Act 
was interpreted as meaning a "power of choice." 
Accordingly, given the power to determine if and 
when and how much might be advanced, the lender had, 
by definition, the power not to advance. Under the terms 
of the agreement, Cottonwood would not have been able 
to force Western to make advances were Western to 
decide unilaterally, as it did when it heard rumors of 
purported default, that it would not make advances -
but under the terms of the agreement Western could 
have determined not to advance without fear of being 
held liable therefor, without having heard rumors of 
default. 
SUMMARY 
Western was the sole judge of whether to advance 
or not. In its "whole" or "sole discretion," it could refuse 
to advance funds, therefore any advances it did make 
must in contemplation of law be volitional or optional 
and take priority only as of the time of each such advance. 
(B) 
POINT I. 
AND IN ANY EVENT, PURSUANT TO THE 
EXPRESS TERMS OF PARA GRAPH 10 OF 
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ITS LOAN AGREEMENT THE LENDER 
WAS RELEASED FROM ANY AND ALL 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, IF ANY 
IT HAD, UPON DEFAULT OF THE BOR-
ROWER AND THUS THE VOLUNTARY 
EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE LENDER 
SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH DEFAULT TAKE 
PRIORITY ONLY AS OF THE TIME OF 
EACH SUCH ADVANCE OR EXPENDI-
TURE. 
The issue here under discussion is factually, com-
pletely independent of the previous discussion concerning 
the volitional or non-volitional nature of the entire mort-
gage transaction. It rests not on the wording of Schedule 
A, but upon paragraph 10 of the Loan Agreement, which 
provides: 
"Should [the borrower] default in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder; or should 
work cease on the improvements, specifically in-
cluding stoppage by the Lender under the terms of 
this Agreement, or for any reason whatsoever, for 
( 15) calendar days; or if the improvements shall 
be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty; 
or in the case of death of any of the undersigned; 
or if a petition in bankruptcy or under any debtor's 
relief law shall be filed by or against any of the 
undersigned; . . . ; [or lien filed against the prem-
ises, etc,] then in any such events, at its option, 
the Lender may, without notice: 
(a) declare all indebtedness secured by 
the mortgage immediately due and payable 
and withdraw all sums in the Account and 
credit the same in such a manner as it elects 
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upon the indebtedness due the Lender, and 
thereupon the Lender shall be released from 
all obligations to the undersigned under this 
Agreement, or 
( b) take possession of the premises and 
let contracts for or proceed with the finishing 
of the improvements and pay the cost thereof 
out of the funds in the Account; should such 
cost amount to more than the balance of the 
Account, then such additional costs may be 
expended at its option by the Lender and they 
shall be secured by the mortgage as herein-
after specified. 
The rights and remedies of the Lender are cumu-
lative and the exercise of any such rights shall not 
operate to waive or cure any default existing under 
the mortgage or note, nor to invalidate any Notice 
of Default or any act done pursuant to such notice 
and shall not prejudice any rights of the Lender 
under the Mortgage." 
The plain, simple effect of paragraph 10 of the Loan 
Agreement, upon its coming into play, is to end any 
legal obligation, if any existed, of the Lender to the 
borrower. That this is so is elemental. The proposition 
that when one has discretion to do or not do something 
he is not legally bound to do it is axiomatic, requiring 
no citation of authority. However, the authorities cited 
in Point I (A) dealing with future volitional advances 
are here pertinent. 
It follows then that, subsequent in time to the 
instance when the lender is relieved of any obligation to 
make advances, if any existed, and such advances or 
expenditures are therefore at his discretion, any such 
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advances or expenditures take priority, as against inter-
vening liens, only as of the time of each such advance. 
Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, supra, involved, 
in the part here pertinent, an almost identical fact situ-
ation and therefore may shed light upon rules and 
reasons for them. The question was there phrased by the 
Washington Supreme Court as: 
" ... When a mortgage, given to secure ad-
vances for the construction of a dwelling house, 
provides that in case of abandonment by the mort-
gagor before completion, for a period of fifteen 
days, the mortgagee may, at its option, enter upon 
the premises and complete the construction and 
add the sums so expended to the principal amount 
provided for in the note and secured by the mort-
gage, and thereafter the mortgagor executes and 
delivers to another a second mortgage on the same 
property for a pre-existing debt, and then aban-
dons construction before the house is completed, 
and the first mortgagee, with actual knowledge of 
the second mortgage, enters upon the premises and 
makes certain expenditures deemed by it necessary 
to complete construction, is the first mortgagee 
entitled to priority over the lien of the second mort-
gagee for the total sum advanced, including the 
sum expended on the property after abandonment 
and notice of the second mortgage?" (Emphasis in 
original) 
In Elmendorf-Anthony, the first mortgagee had 
entered and completed construction under a provision 
in its agreement with the borrower identical in effect 
with the agreement in paragraph 10 of the instant Loan 
Agreement: " ... and in the event of abandonment of 
work upon the construction of the said building or build-
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ings for a period of fifteen days as aforesaid, the mort-
gagee may, at its option, also enter into and upon the 
mortgaged premises and complete the construction of 
the said building . . . and monies so expended . . . shall 
be added to the principal amount of said note and secured 
by these presents . . . . " 
It was held that money expended to put the house 
in saleable condition upon the abandonment by the 
borrower was volitional in nature and that the intervening 
mortgage had priority over such advances. This rule was 
applied without distinction to sums within the stated 
limit of the first note and mortgage and to sums in 
excess thereof. 
Relative to the weight of authority in this regard, 
the Court said, at 256: 
" .... If there were any substantial diversity 
of opinion in the decisions of our sister states, we 
would be inclined to view the rights of the first 
mortgagee relative to advances made pursuant to 
an optional clause in a construction contract, even 
after notice of a junior encumbrance, as superior 
to such junior encumbrance. But as we read the 
cases cited by appellant, not one has reached that 
result, and our own efforts to locate such authority 
has proved unavailing, with the possible exception 
of First National Bank v. Zook, 50 N.D. 423, 196 
N.W. 507." (Emphasis added) 
In the instant controversy, there has been no showing 
that the property would not have been ample security 
for the amount of the then existing indebtedness to the 
lender at the time of default and stoppage of work, not 
that, as indicated in Elmendorf-Anthony Co., such in-
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formation is likely to be material. Nor is there any show-
ing that the large sums voluntarily expended by the lender 
to complete the home and put it into rentable or saleable 
condition were necessary or even desirable to preserve 
the status of its lien pending foreclosure. 
The lender, under its right as against the borrower 
in the Loan Agreement, preempted the venture on Lot 
10 when it was about half finished. R. 151, Exhibit W-84, 
the ledger sheet of Western for Lot 10 shows that as of 
January 24, 1963, approximately $9,462.04 had been 
attributed to this lot by the lender. Subsequent entries 
are after the lender learned of alleged default, refused 
further funds to the builders, took possession itself, and 
completed the home under the optional provision of 
paragraph 10 of the Loan Agreement. 
Such assumption of Cottonwood's venture was not 
even needed - for at this intermediate stage, the lender 
was protected by the buff er afforded by the land value. 
Its mortgage was contractually prior to the purchase 
money mortgage involved. By waiting and taking over 
the venture, expending more money for building and 
other miscellaneous purposes, and charging interest on 
all money expended, the lender undertook to enhance its 
own position at the expense of already disadvantaged 
lienors. This the law should not, and does not, allow. 
Legislative mandate attaches the lienors priority at this 
point in time. This cannot be whittled away or brushed 
under the carpet by self-serving assertions that the prop-
erty is enhanced by the lender's activities, for any such 
enhancement then would merely innure to the benefit of 
the lender, with interest, service charges, etc. 
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A similar situation was encountered in Heller v. Gate 
City Building and Loan Association, supra. There the 
mortgagee under a right to do so given by the mortgage 
made advances for needed repairs, as to which he was 
to be the sole judge as to necessity. The Court held that 
such advances were within the universal rule as to 
volitional future advances and thus inferior to intervening 
rights. 
SUMMARY 
The happening of the event chosen by it to have 
such effect, relieved Western of any contractual liability 
or obligation whatsoever to Cottonwood - assuming it 
had any in the first place. Expenditures thereafter cannot 
rob the lienors of their rightful priority. Expenditures 
thereafter take priority, if any, only as of the date of 
making of each such expenditure. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETER-
MINING IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF ITS AMENDED 
FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL ORDER 
THAT THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY THE AFFI-
DAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
"COMMENCEMENT TO DO WORK OR FUR-
NISH MATERIALS ON THE GROUND FOR THE 
STRUCTURE OR IMPROVEMENT" WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
38-1-5 ( 1953). 
The basic issue before the Court relating to this 
point is simply whether or not the priority of the 
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mechanic's lienors relates back to the time of performance 
of the work and improvements described in the Affi-
davits of Lloyd Jackson, Charles V. King and Durwed 
Cook, relating to Lot 10, Lazy Bar Subdivision. Briefly 
summarized, the facts material to this point are as fol-
lows: 
The first labor performed upon Lot 10, Lazy Bar 
Subdivision, was the surveying and staking work done 
by the engineering firm of Coon, King & Knowlton 
(hereinafter "Coon, et al."), commenced in late 1959 
and completed about October 1, 1960. Between January 
1, 1961, and the end of 1962, sewer and water mains 
were installed in the street adjacent to Lot 10, and a 
lateral sewer line was installed upon Lot 10; the adjacent 
street was graded and completed; and the curb, gutter 
and sidewalk upon Lot 10 were completed. All of this 
work was done by Lloyd and Rex L. Jackson (hereinafter 
"Jacksons"). During the installation of the sewer and 
water mains, the sewer lateral and the sidewalk, curb 
and gutter, and the completion of the road, Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Company (hereinafter 
"Telephone Company") erected poles and ground 
anchors and strung telephone cables to serve Lot 10. 
Respondent's mortgage covering Lot 10 was exe-
cuted, delivered and recorded on October 29, 1962, after 
all of the above described labor was performed upon 
and all of the above described materials were furnished 
to or for the benefit of, Lot 10. 
' 
Lienor Oscar E. Chytraus Company, Inc. performed 
labor upon and furnished materials to, and for the benefit 
of, Lot 10, commencing on or about January 17, 1963, 
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and ending on or about January 18, 1963; lienor Gibbons 
and Reed Concrete Products Company furnished mate-
rials to Lot 10, on or about November 17, 1962; lienor 
Richard P. Garrick performed labor upon and furnished 
materials to Lot 10 commencing on or about October 1, 
1962,
6 
and ending on or about January 9, 1963; and the 
lienor, Boise Cascade Corporation furnished materials 
to Lot 10 commencing on or about November 12 1962 
' ' and ending on or about January 16, 1963. Said defendants 
are hereinafter designated "lienors". 
Defendants submit that under these facts, their liens 
are entitled to the same priority as the liens possessed by 
Coon, et al., Jacksons and the Telephone Company. 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
The following provisions of the Utah Code are 
relevant to a determination of the above stated issue: 
---
Section 38-1-3. "Contractors, subcontractors and 
all persons performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to be used in, the construction or altera-
tion of, or addition to, or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land; all foundry 
men and boiler makers; all persons performing la-
bor or furnishing materials for the construction, 
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory 
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work or 
furnish materials for the prospecting, development, 
preservation or working of any min.ing clai~, mine, 
quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specific~tions, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or supennten-
6. This commencement date has been controverted by the mortgagee and 
cannot be assumed for purposes of this appeal. 
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dence, or who have rendered other like professional 
services, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished ma-
terials, for the value of services rendered, labor per-
formed or materials furnished by each respective-
ly, whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as agent, con-
tractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach only 
to such interest as the owner may have in the prop-
erty, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, 
mine or deposit, whether working under bond or 
otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter in-
clude products mined and excavated while the 
same remain upon the premises included within 
the lease." 
Section 38-1-4. "The liens granted by this chapter 
shall extend to and cover so much of the land 
whereof such building, structure or improvement 
shall be made as may be necessary for the conven-
ient use and occupation thereof ... " 
Section 38-1-5. "The liens herein provided for shall 
relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials 
on the ground for the structure or improvement, 
and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance which may have attached sub-
sequently to the time when the building, improve-
ment or structure was commenced, work begun, 
or first material furnished on the ground; also over 
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which 
th lien holder had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building, structure or im-
provement was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground." 
Section 38-1-10. "The liens for work and labor 
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done or material furnished as provided in this 
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regard-
less of date of filing the notice and claim of lien 
and regardless of the time of performing such 
work and labor or furnishing such material." 
DISCUSSION 
Section 38-1-3, quoted above, establishes beyond 
question that Coon, et al., the engineers who prepared 
the subdivision plat and surveyed the lots, streets, curbs, 
gutters and sidewalks, that the Telephone Company, the 
concern which erected the utility poles and strung the 
telephone cables, and that the Jacksons, who installed the 
sewer mains and laterals, the water mains, the streets, 
the curbs and gutters, and the sidewalks, each acquired 
liens upon Lot 10. See Backus v. H oaten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 
294 P.2d 703 ( 1956); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln 
Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962); Headlund v. 
Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170 ( 1917); see also 
Nolte v. Smith, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261, 87 A.L.R. 2d 996 
( 1961); Annotation, 87 A.L.R. 2d 1004, entitled 
"Mechanic's lien for services in connection with sub-
dividing lands"; Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver 
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 Pac. 254 (1909); Badger 
Lumber Co. v. Marion Water Supply Co., 48 Kan. 182, 
29 Pac. 476 ( 1892); Beatty v. Parker, 141 Mass. 523, 
6 N.E. 754 (1886); and O'Harra v. Frazier, 54 So. 2d 
688 (Fla. 1951). Indeed, Section 38-1-3, by its terms, 
establishes clearly that even the engineers who furnished 
the plats and surveyed the property acquired a lien upon 
Lot 10. Section 38-1-3, is equally clear in establishing 
that the Jacksons and the Telephone Company acquired 
liens. 
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The record establishes with equal clarity that the } 
mechanic lienors had and have liens for the labor and ( 
materials furnished by them to Lot 10. The provisions of 1 
the Utah Code further establish unequivocally the time 
as of which said liens have priority and said provisions 
do not make their priority dependent on whether or not 
the labor and materials relating to the liens were fur-
nished prior to the execution, delivery and/ or recording 
of the mortgages of the plaintiff. Section 38-1-10 provides 
that all liens created by the stature are on an equal foot-
ing regardless of the date of filing of the notice of lien 
and regardless of the time of performing the work or 
furnishing materials giving rise to the lien. Section 38-1-5 
provides that all liens created by the statute relate back 
to and take effect as of "the time of the commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
structure or improvement." 
In short, it is clear from the statute that Coon, et al., 
the Telephone Company, the Jacksons and the mechanic's 
lienors, each had a lien upon Lot 10. It is equally clear 
from the statute that each of these liens under the statute 
is on an equal footing. Finally, the statute also makes 
clear that each of these liens became effective as of the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish mate-
rials by any potential lienor on the particular lot to which 
such liens relate. Squarely in point is United States Bldg. 
& Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 
506, 44 P.2d 1090, 1093-94 ( 1935). See also Teahen v. 
Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 Pac. 764 ( 1890); Morrison v. 
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 Pac. 238 ( 1893); 
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 Pac. 363 ( 1906); 
also Culmer v. Caine, 22 Utah 216, 61 Pac. 1008 ( 1909); 
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Fields v. Daisy Gold Mine Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 Pac. 528 
( 1902); Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 
Pac. 713 ( 1906) . 
Paragraph 4 of the Fifth Supplemental Pretrial 
Order, wherein the trial court denied the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Chytraus does not reveal the 
theory upon which the trial court reached its conclusion. 
It does not appear that the trial court directly considered 
the impact of the Utah statutes relied upon herein as 
quoted and discussed hereinabove. 
It may be that the trial court concluded that the 
labor and materials furnished by Coon, et al., the Jack-
sons and the Telephone Company were not furnished for 
the same improvement as were the materials furnished 
by the mechanic's lienors. If this is the basis for the 
ruling of the trial court, it is erroneous on two grounds. 
First, as a matter of fact, the labor and materials fur-
nished by Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone 
Company were furnished for the same improvement as 
were the materials furnished by the mechanic's lienors. 
It is plain, and undisputed, that the defendant Cotton-
wood Construction Company, and its predecessors in 
interest, conceived, planned and carried out the develop-
ment of the Lazy Bar Subdivision as a unified and 
integrated project. That is, Cottonwood Construction 
Company and its predecessors in interest subdivided the 
land and undertook to construct dwellings upon the 
lots in the subdivision for sale to the public. Thus, the 
surveying of the lots, the installation of sewer and water 
mains in the streets, the grading and completion of the 
streets, the installation of the curb, gutter and sidewalk 
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upon Lot 10, and the installation of the sewer lateral 
upon Lot 10, together with the erection of utility poles 
and stringing of cables, were all a part of the improve-
ment of a residential dwelling lot for sale to the public. 
The labor and materials subsequently furnished by the 
mechanic's lienors and used in connection with Lot 10 
for the further improvement of that lot for sale to the 
public were furnished for the same improvement as were 
the labor and materials furnished by Coon, et al., the 
Jacksons and the Telephone Company. See Park City 
Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., supra; King 
Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., supra; Badger Lumber 
Co. v. Marion Water Supply Co., supra; and Beatty v. 
Parker, supra. 
The apparent conclusion of the trial court is also 
erroneous as a matter of law. There is absolutely no 
provision of the Utah statutes relating to mechanic's liens 
that provides for a different priority of mechanic's liens 
depending upon the particular aspects of the improve-
ment to which the several mechanic's lienholders fur-
nished material or labor. Indeed, any such differentation 
would be intolerable, for the result would be that the 
priorities of persons who furnish labor or materials would 
be different if, for example, they furnished labor and 
materials for the sidewalk as opposed to the driveway, 
for a separate garage as opposed to the house itself, for 
a retaining wall as opposed to a fence, for a sewer line 
as opposed to a water line, and for a telephone line as 
opposed to a power line. Such distinctions would make 
a mockery of the plain legislative intent that all persons 
furnishing labor or materials for the improvement of 
land are entitled to liens which have equal priority, 
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taking effect as of the date of commencement of the 
labor or furnishing of materials. This legislative intent 
is made clear beyond doubt by Section 38-1-10, which 
provides that: 
"The liens for work or labor done or material fur-
nished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an 
equal footing, regardless of the date of filing the 
notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time 
of performing such work and labor or furnishing 
such material." 
This provision is not limited to liens for work and 
labor done for, or material furnished to, the same 
aspect of the contemplated improvement as the trial 
court apparently concluded. The provision relates to all 
liens, "provided in this chapter." The priority of all such 
liens is provided in Section 38-1-5 to be the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials upon the 
ground for the structure upon or the improvement of 
the land. See Teahen v. Nelson, supra, Morrison v. Carey-
Lombard Co., supra, and Sanford v. Kunkel, supra. In 
Sanford this Court phrased the rule as follows: 
"Under the statute, the lien had its inception from 
the time of the commencement of the work and 
the furnishing of material, and by relation, takes 
effect after that date, and is given priority over 
any lien or encumbrance subsequently interven-
. " mg ... 
SUMMARY 
The issue presented for decision under this point is 
easily resolved. It is clear that the performance of labor 
upon and the furnishing of materials to Lot 10 com-
menced long before the execution, delivery and recording 
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of the mortgages of respondent. The statutes do not re-
quire that such labor or materials be furnished to the 
same particular building or structure. Even if the statute 
did require that, for the mechanic lienors to share the 
priority of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone 
Company, the labor performed and materials furnished 
be related to the same particular aspect of the im-
provement, this would be satisfied in this ca<;e. The 
sidewalks, curb and gutter installed upon the surface of 
Lot 10 had utility only in connection with a dwelling. 
The sewer lateral installed below the surface of Lot 10, 
for a distance inside the line, could only be for connection 
to the dwelling house constructed upon Lot 10. The utility 
poles erected and cables strung by the Telephone Com-
pany had utility only when connected to the dwelling 
house constructed. Obviously, the labor and materials 
furnished by the lienors had utility only in connection 
with such dwelling house. 
Section 38-1-3 accords to each of the parties who 
performed such work and furnished such materials a 
mechanic's lien upon Lot 10. Sections 38-1-4 and 38-1-10 
dictate that all mechanic's liens upon Lot 10 shall be upon 
an equal footing, and Section 38-1-5 expressly provides 
that the priority of all such liens relates back to and takes 
effect as of the performance of the first labor or the 
furnishing of the first materials giving rise to the lien 
senior among the group of liens. 
Thus, the liens of the mechanic's lienors upon Lot 10 
are of equal priority and stand with the liens of Coon, 
et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone Company. The 
liens of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the Telephone 
Comf 
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Company are admittedly prior to the liens of the 
mortgage of respondent. Inasmuch as the liens of the 
mechanic's lienors are by the express provisions of the 
statute, upon an equal footing and of an equal priority 
with the liens of Coon, et al., the Jacksons and the 
Telephone Company, their priority over the liens of the 
mortgage of respondent is equally clear. 
It is respectfully submitted that the record and the 
applicable law establish the priority of the mechanic's 
liens of the appellants over the liens of the mortgage of 
respondent, and thereby establish that the trial court 
erred in denying the Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in holding, in connection with such denial, that the liens 
of the mechanic's lienors are not prior and superior to 
the liens of the mortgage of respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein ,appellants respectfully 
pray that this Court reverse the trial court's interlocutory 
order appealed from in the following particulars: 
1. By determining that the construction financing 
transaction did not provide for obligatory (or more 
properly, "non-volitional") advances but that, on the 
contrary, it provided for optional (or more properly, 
"volitional") advances which take priority only as of the 
time of each such advance, or 
2. By determining that, in any event, volitional ex-
penditures made at the option of the mortgagee sub-
sequent to the default of the borrower take priority only 
as of the time of each such expenditure. 
3. And, in any event, remand with instructions to 
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grant the mechanic's lienors' motion for partial summary 
judgment to the effect that the work evidenced by 
affidavits in support of said motion constituted "com-
mencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement" within the meaning 
of section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, ( 1953). 
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APPENDIX A 
Will a decision favorable to the mechanic's 
lienors on this appeal preclude construction 
financing in Utah? 
Always implicit, and often explicit, in litigation of 
this type is the question of whether a decision contrary 
to the construction lender - no matter how justified 
upon legal principles - will lead to the withdrawal of 
construction financing from Utah. 
The table below affords the answer to the inquiry. 
Each of our sister states listed afforded construction 
lenders in 1964 much less favorable priority treatment 
than that advocated by the appellants herein. Yet each 
issued more new unit permits per capita than did Utah. 
What the table demonstrates is that the prosperity 
of a given state's construction industry depends upon 
economic, more than legal, factors. Adjustments to legal 
requirements have always been, and can always be, made 
by lenders of any type, including construction lenders. 
If a Colorado construction lender could, in 1964, adjust 
to absolute mechanic's lien priority through careful dis-
bursal of funds, a Utah construction lender can, as easily, 
either provide such a disbursal or utilize non-volititional 
paper. Equally, the lender can assure that labor has not 
been done or material has not arrived on the site prior 
to recordation of the mortgage. 
There are other states, e.g. Alabama, with both 
stricter laws and a lower ratio of new permits per capita 
than Utah. They do not derogate from the point just 
made, however, but rather reinforce it, for they again 
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illustrate the complete non-relationship between new 
construction and reasonable legal safeguards against 
construction lender abuse. 
PRIORITIES AND NEW UNIT PERMITS, 1964 
State Legal Situation New Unit1 
Permits 
Colorado Absolute lienholder 16,985 
priority, Darien v. 
Hudson, 134 Colo. 213, 
302 P. 2d 519 (1956) 
Missouri Absolute lienholder 35, 711 
priority as to build-
ing, etc., which pur-
chaser on execution 
has right to remove 
within reasonable time. 
Missouri Rev. St. 
§429.050 ( 1959) 
Oregon Absolute lienholder 15,655 
priority as to improve-
ment, which purchaser 
Virginia 
Utah 
on execution has right 
to remove within 
reasonable time. 
Oregon Rev. St. 
§§87.010, 87.025 
( 1963 Rep. part) 
Lienholder prior as to 37,680 
improvement; prior 
lien entitled only to 
value of land on fore-
closure. Virginia 
Code §43-21 (1950) 
6,160 
Popula-
tion2 
1,966,000 
4,409,000 
1,871,000 
4,378,000 
992,000 
Permits 
Per 
Capita 
1: 116 
1:123 
1:120 
1: 116 
1:161 
1. New Unit Permits figures were obtained by cumulating statistics in U. S. 
Bureau of Census, Construction Reports - Building Permtis, Housing 
Authorized in Individual Permit-Issuing Places: 1964. Table 1. 
2. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1965, page 11. 
